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Abstract Robustness is a correctness notion for concurrent programs
running under relaxed consistency models. The task is to check that
the relaxed behavior coincides (up to traces) with sequential consistency
(SC). Although computationally simple on paper (robustness has been
shown to be PSPACE-complete for TSO, PGAS, and Power), building
a practical robustness checker remains a challenge. The problem is that
the various relaxations lead to a dramatic number of computations, only
few of which violate robustness.
In the present paper, we set out to reduce the search space for robustness
checkers. We focus on store-atomic consistency models and establish two
completeness results. The first result, called locality, states that a non-
robust program always contains a violating computation where only one
thread delays commands. The second result, called singularity, is even
stronger but restricted to programs without lightweight fences. It states
that there is a violating computation where a single store is delayed.
As an application of the results, we derive a linear-size source-to-source
translation of robustness to SC-reachability. It applies to general pro-
grams, regardless of the data domain and potentially with an unbounded
number of threads and with unbounded buffers. We have implemented
the translation and verified, for the first time, PGAS algorithms in a fully
automated fashion. For TSO, our analysis outperforms existing tools.
1 Introduction
Performance drives the design of computer architectures. The computation time
of a task depends on the time it takes to access the memory. To reduce the
access time, the idea is to place the data close to the compute unit. This idea is
applied on virtually all design layers, from multiprocessors to high-performance
computing clusters. Yet, the realization is different. Multiprocessors like Intel’s
x86 [38] and Sparc’s PSO [42] implement thread-local instruction buffers that
allow to execute store commands without waiting for the memory. The effect
of buffered stores will be visible to other threads only when the multiprocessor
decides to batch process the buffer, thus leading to a reordering of instructions.
Clusters often implent a programming model called partitioned global address
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space (PGAS), either in terms of APIs like SHMEM [20], ARMCI [35], GAS-
NET [11], GPI [32], and GASPI [25], or by HPC languages like UPC [21], Ti-
tanium [26], and Co-Array Fortran [36]. The PGAS model joins the partitioned
memories of the cluster nodes into one (virtual) global memory. The selling point
of PGAS is one-sided communication: A thread can modify a part of the global
memory that resides in another node, without having to synchronize with that
node. The drawback is the network delay. Although already computed, it may
take a moment to install a value in the memory of another node.
Moving the data to the computation is delicate. When the data is shared,
it has to be split into copies, one copy for each thread holding the datum. But
then, in the interest of performance, updates to one copy cannot be propagated
immediately to the other copies. This means the computations have to relax the
guarantees given by an atomic memory and captured by the notion of sequential
consistency (SC) [31]. The commands no longer take effect on the global mem-
ory in program order but may be reordered by the architecture. An important
guarantee of SC, however, remains true in all the above models: Store atomicity.
Once a store command arrives at the global memory, it is visible to all threads.
Programming a shared memory is difficult. Having to take into account the
reorderings of the architecture makes programming in the presence of relaxed
consistency close to impossible. SC-preserving compilers have been proposed as
an approach to the problem and receive considerable attention [6,14,24,33,39,40].
The idea is to let the developer implement for SC, and make it the task of the
compiler to insert synchronization primitives that justify the SC-assumption
for the targeted architecture. Algorithmically, justifying the SC-assumption
amounts to checking a problem known as robustness (against the architecture of
interest): For every relaxed computation there has to be an SC-computation
with the same behavior. The notion of behavior to be preserved typically
(and also in this work) is the happens-before traces [30]. When developing
an SC-preserving compiler, checking robustness is the main task. Inferring
synchronization primitives from indications of non-robustness is better under-
stood [1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 13, 27, 29, 34, 41].
An SC-preserving compiler needs an over-approximate robustness analysis
that should be as precise as possible. Under-approximations like bounded model
checking [5, 15, 16], simulation [8], or monitoring [17, 18] may miss non-robust
computations and insert too few fences. Over-approximations, if too coarse, lead
to over-fencing. Although decision procedures for robustness exist [14, 19, 23],
building an efficient and yet precise robustness checker remains a challenge. The
problem is the immense degree of non-determinism brought by the instruction
reorderings that is hard to reflect in the analysis. This non-determinism forces
over-approximations into explicitly modeling architectural details like instruction
buffers [1,4,22,28] (operational approaches) or right-away operating on the code
(axiomatic approaches) [3, 6, 39].
In this paper, we contribute two semantical results about robustness that
limit the degree of non-determinism that has to be taken into account by algo-
rithmic analyses. Both results state that robustness violations can be detected —
in a complete way — with a restricted form of reorderings. The first result, called
locality, states that only one thread needs to make use of instruction reorder-
ings. The other threads operate as if they were running under SC: A program
is not robust if and only if there is a violating computation where exactly one
thread delays stores. The second result, called singularity, is even stronger: A
program without lightweight fence instructions is not-robust if and only if there
is a violating computation with exactly one delayed store. Note that a program
without delays is robust. This means the result is an optimal characterization of
non-robustness. Singularity only holds in the absence of lightweight fences. We
do not consider this a severe limitation. Robustness is meant as a subroutine
for fence inference inside an SC-preserving compiler. In that setting, programs
naturally come without fences.
Our third contribution shows that the development of specialized robustness
analyses can be avoided. Utilizing locality and singularity, we give an instrumen-
tation that reduces robustness to reachability under SC. By instrumentation, we
mean a source-to-source translation of a given program P into a program P ′
so that the former is robust if and only if the latter does not reach under SC
a designated state. This allows us to employ for the analysis of robustness all
techniques and tools that have been developed for SC-reachability. As a side-
effect, we obtain the decidability of robustness for parameterized programs over
a finite data domain. The restriction to finite data domains is not necessary for
the instrumentation itself, but for the back-end SC-reachability analysis.
Concerning the model, we show that locality holds for virtually all store-
atomic consistency models (singularity holds in the absence of dependencies).
Inspired by [9], we introduce a programming language for concurrent programs
that is meant to act as a programming framework for store-atomic models. The
syntax of our language is an assembly dialect enriched with a variety of fence
commands. The semantics is defined weak enough to support the relaxations
found in the models discussed above. What makes our programming language a
programming framework is that, given a program, we can add appropriate fences
to obtain the behavior under SC, TSO, PSO, and PGAS. The motivation for
having a programming framework is that we can show locality and singularity
once for this model, and it will then hold for all instances of the framework.
For improved readability, this paper contains only a comprehensible high-
level explanation of our techniques. The full technical formalizations and proofs
can be found in the appendix.
2 Related Work
Robustness checks that the relaxed behavior of a program is the same as the be-
havior under SC. The definition is relative to a notion of behavior, and there are
various proposals in the literature [1,2,39]. To make the most of the consistency
model in terms of performance, the notion of behavior should be liberal enough
to equate quite distinct computations. On the other hand, it should be strong
enough to be easy to check algorithmically. Equivalence of the happens-before
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Figure 1. Normal-form results for violating computations under relaxed consistency.
traces [39] appears to be a good compromise between expressiveness and algorith-
mics, and is the favored notion in the literature on robustness [6,13,14,17,18,19].
Abdulla et al. recently proposed an alternative that is incomparable with the
happens-before traces [2]. The idea is to preserve the total ordering of all stores
and drop the relations for loads. This equivalence leads to efficient algorithmics
for TSO but does not seem to fit well with consistency models beyond TSO.
State-space equivalence from [1] leads to non-primitive recursive lower bounds
for robustness, and will therefore also not be our choice.
In our earlier work on TSO [13], PGAS [19], and Power [23], we established
normal form results similar to locality and singularity and also made use of
the combinatorial proof principle. We elaborate on why the reasoning in this
paper is substantially different from our earlier efforts. Figure 1 summarizes
the comparison. The results about PGAS [19] and Power [23] rely on a normal
form (Ordered in Figure 1) for violating computations where all threads delay
commands. As the normal form gives weak guarantees, it can be established
with a cost function that simply measures the length of violating computations.
The value of these earlier results is in that they apply to all consistency models
which forbid out-of-thin-air values, while giving the precise complexity (but no
useful algorithms). For TSO, we proved locality in [14]. As TSO architectures
have one buffer per thread, we were able to apply a cost function that only
measures delays, i.e., the number of commands that are processed while a store
is being buffered (Figure 1). In this paper, we also have to account for overtakes
of stores in different buffers. Another aspect is that, for TSO, we managed to
leave the happens-before trace unchanged. We tried to lift this strategy to PGAS
but failed. Instead, we show how to construct a different computation that still
is a violation. Taking apart the computation was a big step.
The instrumentation we present in Section 8 is related to our work on
TSO [13]. To be precise, we adapt the instrumentation of the attacker (that
delays commands) to the assumption of singularity and to the more relaxed
consistency model. The instrumentation of the helper threads (that close the
happens-before cycle) is the one from ESOP’13. Since our earlier work assumes
locality, the new instrumentation (for singularity) is more compact (we save
a linear number of auxiliary addresses). An alternative instrumentation-based
robustness analysis is presented in [4]. The instrumentation precomputes an
optimized cycle and then checks robustness wrt. that cycle. The idea can be un-
derstood as trading one complex verification task (robustness) for a number of
tasks (robustness wrt. a cycle) that can be solved more efficiently. A strong point
is that the approach is general enough to apply to non-store-atomic consistency
models, including Power. For TSO, PSO, and PGAS, also that instrumentation
will benefit (in terms of size) from locality and singularity. Related is also the
instrumentation in [2]. Atig et al. only have to add two variables to the program,
which means the instrumentation is more compact than ours. But, as explained
above, the approach does not seem to be generalizable beyond TSO.
Instrumentations that mimic the effect of instruction buffers can also be
found in reachability analyses for relaxed consistency models. Bouajjani et al.
apply the idea of bounded context switching to TSO [10]. Vechev et al. [22]
precompute the utilization of the instruction buffers in TSO and PSO, and show
how to mimic them under SC without having to shift content between variables.
Common to both works is that they eagerly simulate the effect of buffers. In [12],
we show how to introduce store buffering lazily, and only where needed to satisfy
a TSO reachability query: The idea is to guide the store buffering by non-robust
computations. Hence, also reachability analyses benefit from the improvements
for robustness presented here.
In this paper, we focus on store-atomic memory models. Although store
atomicity feels like a natural requirement, important multiprocessors like
Power [8, 23, 37] or ARM [8] are known to be non-store atomic. There, stores
to independent variables may arrive in independent threads in a different order.
What remains true is coherence. All threads see the stores to each variable in
the same order. A major challenge for future work is to understand whether a
locality result can be established for Power, potentially under mild assumptions
on the programs. With the results in this paper, singularity can be shown not
to hold, Figure 1.
3 Locality and Singularity on an Example
We illustrate the concept of robustness and the main results on singularity and
locality with the help of message passing, an idiom common in shared memory
concurrent programming. The code is as follows:
program MessagePassing
thread tw regs init l0 begin
l0: mem[d1] ← 1; goto l1;
l1: mem[d2] ← 1; goto l2;
l2: mem[flag] ← 1; goto l3;
end
thread tr regs r init lx begin
lx: r ← mem[flag]; goto ly;
ly: assert r = 1; goto lz;
lz: r ← mem[d1]; goto l;
end
The task of the idiom is to signal to thread tr (called reader) that the data
written by thread tw (called writer) is ready for use. The idiom is useful when
a : mem[d1] ← 1 d : r ← mem[flag]
b : mem[d2] ← 1 e : assert r = 1
c : mem[flag] ← 1 f : r ← mem[d1]
po
po
po
po
cf src
Figure 2. Happens-before trace Tr(τ ) of computation τ .
the data to be written cannot be updated atomically. The situation is as follows.
The writer stores data in the addresses d1 and d2. To hand over the data to the
reader, tw raises flag (initially, all addresses are 0). The reader reads the flag
and finds it raised. From this, it concludes that d1 has a new value and reads it.
For message passing to work, we need the following guarantee: Before the flag
is raised, the stores to d1 and d2 have to be visible in memory. The guarantee
holds for SC and TSO but does not hold for PGAS. Indeed, without further
synchronization the above code will fail on a cluster. The stores to d1 and d2
may be delayed due to network latencies (they may be big packages). While
these stores are being processed, the flag is successfully set. The reader sees the
flag and reads the old (or broken due to an incomplete transfer) value at d1.
The message passing idiom is not robust. It works properly under SC but fails
when ported to PGAS. Formally, robustness requires that for every computation
under PGAS there is a computation under SC that has the same happens-before
trace. We will show that this is not the case. Consider the computation
τ = isua · isub · isuc · c · d · e · f · b · a,
where isua gives the moment when action a is issued and a itself gives the moment
when the command is executed on memory. The meaning of the actions is given
in Figure 2, which shows the happens-before trace Tr(τ) of the computation. The
happens-before trace reflects the crucial dependencies among the actions: The
program order, the store order, and the source and conflict relations between
loads and stores. Computations with the same happens-before trace only differ
in how they shuffle independent action. For computation τ , we see that the flag
raised by action c is read by action d (indicated by the source relation), but the
load of d1 in action f is overwritten by the later action a (conflict relation).
The load at f obtains an old value although the flag was raised. Under
SC where commands take immediate effect this is impossible. Formally, the
fundamental lemma of Shasha and Snir states that for a relaxed computation
τ there is an SC-computation σ with Tr(τ) = Tr(σ) if and only if Tr(τ) is
acyclic [39]. As the above Tr(τ) is cyclic, computation τ has no SC-equivalent.
Hence, message passing is not robust.
Our singularity result shows that the above computation is unnecessarily
complicated. The theorem states that we need to delay only one action in order
to find a robustness violation (a computation with a cyclic trace). In the example,
we can avoid the delay of action b. Computation
τ ′ = isua · isub · b · isuc · c · d · e · f · a
has the same (cyclic) happens-before trace as τ but only delays a.
To render formally the intuitive feeling that computation τ ′ is less relaxed
than τ , we associate with each computation a cost. The cost of computation τ
is $(τ) = (6, 3, 9). There are 6 delays. Indeed, a is delayed past isub · isuc · c · b
and b is delayed past isuc · c. There are 3 reordering, action a is issued before b
and c but hits the memory later. Similarly, b gets reordered past c. Altogether
there are 9 actions. For computation τ ′, we have $(τ ′) = (4, 2, 9). We compare
the costs lexicographically and find τ ′ less relaxed.
4 Concurrent Programs
Syntax The syntax of our programming language is defined below. A concurrent
program is identified by a name and consists of a finite set of named threads.
The threads share a global memory. Moreover, each thread defines a finite set
of local registers. The code is given as a finite set of labelled instructions. Each
instruction includes a command and the label of the instruction to be executed
next. To model non-deterministic choices, several instructions can have the same
label. The instruction set includes loads from memory, stores to memory, local
assignments, asserts, and two kinds of fences. SC-fences forbid relaxations al-
together. The second fence command is parameterized by a set of addresses.
To be more precise, the program comes with a domain DOM the elements of
which model the data values as well as the addresses in the global memory. We
assume the domain contains a distinguished value 0 ∈ DOM that will be used
for initialization purposes. Besides DOM, there is also a function domain FUN
that contains elements from DOM∗ → DOM. All functions that are used in
expressions have to stem from FUN.
〈prog〉 ::= program 〈pid〉 〈thrd〉∗
〈thrd〉 ::= thread 〈tid〉
regs 〈reg〉∗
init 〈label〉
begin 〈linst〉∗ end
〈linst〉 ::= 〈label〉: 〈inst〉; goto 〈label〉;
〈inst〉 ::= 〈reg〉 ← mem[〈expr〉]
| mem[〈expr〉] ← 〈expr〉
| 〈reg〉 ← 〈expr〉
| assert 〈expr〉
| scfence
| fence 〈expr〉∗
〈expr〉 ::= 〈fun〉( 〈reg〉∗ )
Semantics Under SC, a store command takes immediate effect on the global
memory. We consider consistency models that relax the program order but pre-
serve store atomicity. This means the effect of a store command may not become
visible immediately (to the other threads), but later commands may overtake the
store and hit the memory earlier than the store. What is guaranteed, however,
is that once the store is visible it is visible to all threads.
The semantics specifies C(P), i.e., the set of computations for program P . We
define the relaxed semantics of our assembly language in an operational style, in
terms of a hardware architecture that processes instructions. In this model, out-
of-program-order computations result from the use of instruction buffers inside
the architecture. To provide an umbrella for different store-atomic models, the
architecture has two types of buffers. Buffers of the first type are per thread and
per address FIFO buffers that only hold stores of one thread to one address.
Buffers of the second type are per thread FIFO buffers that hold stores of one
thread to potentially different addresses. The per-address buffers emulate PGAS.
An all-addresses buffer mimics TSO.
When a thread issues a store, the instruction is put into the corresponding
per-address buffer. From the per-address buffers, the store non-deterministically
advances to the all-addresses buffer of that thread. From the all-addresses buffer,
the store eventually arrives at the global memory. Due to the per-address buffers,
stores of the same thread to different addresses may enter the memory in an order
different from the order in which they were issued.
When doing a load, a thread checks whether there is a store to the address
of interest kept in one of the store buffers. If not, the thread loads the current
value from the main memory. If so, the thread loads the value of the most recent
store in the buffers (where stores in the per-address buffers are more recent than
stores in the all-addresses buffer). The definition ensures that the thread sees its
own stores in issue order. Even more, for a sequential program the architecture
appears to implement SC.
To synchronize different threads, the language offers two fence instructions.
The scfence instruction can only be executed if all buffers of the executing
thread are empty. Additionally, we have the fence instruction that carries a
list of addresses. It can be executed if the buffers for the given addresses in the
executing thread are empty.
We show that the framework encompasses the consistency models we aim at.
Sequential consistency Lamport’s SC [31] is the intuitive consistency model
that reflects an atomic shared memory. Formally, the SC-computations are the
valid interleavings of the computations of all threads. We can mimic SC in our
framework by letting stores directly go to memory. To enforce this, one can insert
an scfence after each store. We avoid this modification and just write CSC(P)
to mean the set of SC-computations of program P .
Total Store Ordering TSO implements the store-to-load relaxation. Each
thread has a single buffer for stores, and loads may overtake buffered stores
when early reads fail. Notably, the thread-local total order of stores is preserved.
Intel’s x86 architecture implements TSO [38].
The all-addresses buffers in our framework are meant to mimic TSO. To
preserve the total order of stores, the per-address buffers must not be used. We
can insert fence instructions after each store command to enforce TSO.
Partial Store Ordering For PSO [42], there are two kinds of relaxation, the
store-to-load relaxations of TSO and the store-to-store relaxation. The latter
means that stores of the same thread to different addresses can be reflected in
the global memory in an order that is different from the program order.
The per-address-buffers enable the additional store-to-store relaxation. As
long as a store resides in its per-address buffer, stores to other addresses can be
executed faster and the buffered store gets delayed. A program that is executed
unmodified (without further fences) in our framework will run with PSO seman-
tics. The benefit of PSO is that it approximates well the behavior of PGAS.
Partitioned Global Address Space In a PGAS clusters, the cluster nodes
create FIFO buffers to transfer data to and request data from neighboring nodes.
The transfer itself is handled by the network infrastructure. PGAS APIs allow
the user to specify the buffer that should be used for a transfer. A comparison
and precise model of PGAS APIs can be found in [19]. The model presented here
is designed as an approximation of PGAS that is less complex and hence easier
to handle wrt. the theory we develop. Rather than assigning stores to buffers, we
give each store a separate buffer, like in PSO. The user defined sharing of buffers
is mimicked by the parameterized fences. The approximation is a bit weak as it
forces different buffers into a total ordering.
5 Robustness
We first define the happens-before relation and, based on this, the notion of
robustness. As a first step towards locality and singularity, we then work out
properties of computations that violate robustness.
Given τ ∈ C(P), the happens-before relation highlights the crucial control
and data-flow dependencies in the computation. Crucial means that an alterna-
tive computation with the same relations and valid delays is guaranteed to be
executable in the program. In particular, all asserts will receive the same values.
Technically, the happens-before relation →hb = →po ∪ →st ∪ →src ∪ →cf is the
union of different dependencies between two actions. The program order →po
denotes the control flow between actions of the same thread. The remaining or-
ders can be summarized as follows. Whenever two actions x and y operate on
the same address in the shared memory, follow each other in τ , and at least
one of them is a store, then we have x →hb y. It is common to distinguish the
relations according to the commands. The store order →st denotes the order in
which two stores to the same address reach the memory. The source relation
→src goes from a store action to a load action of the same address and denotes
the fact that the load reads the value written by that store. The conflict relation
→cf is a derived relation and says that a load has to happen before a store that
potentially overwrites the value to be read.
The happens-before trace Tr(τ) associated with computation τ ∈ C(P) is the
directed graph where the nodes are the actions from τ . To be precise, isux and
store or fence x are represented by the same node x. The edges are given by the
four happens-before relations. Note that each computation induces a trace but
several computations can have the same trace.
The robustness problem is to check, given a concurrent program, whether the
traces obtained from the computations in the model from the previous section
are included in the traces of the SC computations:
Given program P , does Tr(C(P)) ⊆ Tr(CSC(P)) hold?
Algorithmically, the task is to look for violations of robustness, computations
τ ∈ C(P) with Tr(τ) /∈ Tr(CSC(P)). Shasha and Snir observed that violating
computations are precisely those with a cyclic happens-before relation.
Lemma 1 ([39]). Consider τ ∈ C(P). Then Tr(τ) ∈ Tr(CSC(P)) if and only if
Tr(τ) is acyclic.
To see this, consider an acyclic trace. It will have a linearization that forms
an SC computation. In turn, every SC computation will have an acyclic trace.
Under SC, all commands execute atomically and there is no chance for delays.
The following development can be understood as strengthening the insight of
Shasha and Snir.
5.1 Minimal Violations
To deepen our understanding of violating computations, we will concentrate on
violations that are minimal in a carefully chosen order. The main finding is
the following. In a minimal violation, every delay is due to a cycle. To derive
this fact, we employ an interesting proof strategy that establishes properties
by contradiction and that will occur in variants throughout the paper. Starting
from a minimal violation, we assume the property of interest would not hold and
from this deduce the existence of a smaller violation.
Technically, we define minimal violations with the help of a cost function
$(−) mapping computations to a well-founded domain. Intuitively, the cost of
a computation reflects its degree of relaxation. A minimal violation is then a
violation that is as little relaxed as possible (while being a violation). Phrased
differently, the computation is as close to SC as possible. Hence, the cost can
also be understood as a penalty for deviating from SC.
The thing to note about the definition of cost is that we define it on the
per-thread computations. This means that two computations τ1, τ2 ∈ C(P) with
the same per-thread computations, τ1 ↓ t = τ2 ↓ t for all threads t, will have the
same cost, $(τ1) = $(τ2). Like the proof strategy, this equality will be applied
over and over again. It allows us to choose between different interleavings while
preserving minimality.
Technically, the cost of a computation is a triple of natural numbers:
$(τ) := (delays(τ), reorders(τ), length(τ)) ∈ N3.
We refer to the three auxiliary functions as penalty functions and define them
below. Cost triples in N3 are compared lexicographically, so (4, 0, 6) < (4, 1, 5).
When we refer to a minimal violation, we mean a violation τ where the cost $(τ)
is minimal in the set of violating computations.
The intuitive meaning of the penalty functions is as follows. The function
delays(−) increases when actions happen between an issue and the corresponding
store or fence action in memory. Such intermediary actions indicate a delay of
the store. Since delays are impossible under SC, there is a penalty for them. To
be precise, we only consider intermediary actions from the thread that executed
the store or fence. The function reorders(−) gives a penalty to reordering delayed
stores. It increases when stores reach the memory in an order different from the
order in which they were issued. Keeping this function value small forces stores
of the same thread to different variables to respect the program order. Finally,
function length(−) gives the computation’s length as we would like to focus on
violations that do not contain unnecessary actions. We turn to the formalization.
The length of a computation τ , denoted by length(τ), is the number of actions
in τ . The special case ε is defined to have length zero.
To define the number of delays, consider the computation τ = τ1 ·isua ·τ2 ·a·τ3
where a is a delayed store or fence action. Let thread(a) := t. We say that a
overtakes every action in τ2 projected to t. Hence, for this one store or fence the
number of delays is delays(a) := length(τ2 ↓ t). The number of delays in τ is the
sum of the delays of all stores and fences:
delays(τ) :=
∑
all stores and fences a in τ
delays(a) .
A store or fence a is said to be reordered if it overtakes another issue isub
together with the corresponding store or fence b. Here, a and b are supposed to
have the same thread thread(a) = t = thread(b). So we have
τ = τ1 · isua · τ2 · a · τ3 with τ2 = τ2a · isub · τ2b · b · τ2c .
The number of reorders for the store a, denoted by reorders(a), is the number
of such stores or fences b in τ2 ↓ t. The number of reorders in a computation τ ,
reorders(τ), is again the sum of the reorders of all stores and fences in τ .
5.2 Cycles
Our goal is to establish the following result about minimal violations. Whenever
we have an action a that has been overtaken by another action b, then we
already find a cycle involving the two. To be more precise, either the cycle is via
the intermediary actions between a and b (Proposition 1(i)), or the cycle is via
a dependency from isub to a (Proposition 1(ii)). For the precise statement, we
need a stronger variant of the happens-before relation.
We will often argue that some of the intermediary actions are sufficient to es-
tablish the existence of a happens-before path between two actions. To make this
dependence on the intermediary actions explicit, we recall the happens-before-
through relation from [14]. It can be understood as embedding the happens-
before relation, or more generally the trace, into the underlying computation,
which is a linear structure. Consider the computation τ = τ1 ·a ·τ2 ·b ·τ3 ∈ C(P).
We say that action a happens before action b through τ2, if there is a subsequence
a1 . . . an of τ2 so that one of
ai →
+
po ai+1, ai →src ai+1, ai →st ai+1, or ai →cf ai+1
holds for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n with a0 := a and an+1 := b. We also refer to a0 · . . . ·an+1
as a happens-before-through chain.
Proposition 1 (Cycles). Let τ = τ1 ·a ·τ2 ·b ·τ3 ∈ C(P) be a minimal violation
where a has been overtaken by b. One of the following holds:
(i) b →+po a and a→
+
hb b through τ2
(ii) a→+po b and τ1 = τ1a · isub · τ1b and isub →
+
hb a through τ1b.
Remark: Both cases lead to a happens-before cycle with actions in τ1 · a · τ2 · b.
The proof of Proposition 1 is non-trivial and relies on a strong dichotomy
result, Lemma 2. The lemma is a disjunction (i) or (ii) and should be read as
two implications. If we read it as ¬(i) implies (ii), it states that given a minimal
violation two actions can be swapped as long as they are not separated by a
happens-before-through chain. This will allow us to modify a given computation.
If we read the dichotomy as ¬(ii) implies (i), it states that given a minimal
violation whenever we see two actions of the same thread we are already sure to
have a happens-before-through chain between them.
Lemma 2 (Dichotomy [14]). In a minimal violation τ = τ1 ·a·τ2 ·b·τ3 ∈ C(P)
(i) a→+hb b through τ2 or
(ii) there is τ ′ = τ1 · τ21 · b · a · τ22 · τ3 ∈ C(P) with Tr(τ) = Tr(τ
′), τ ↓ t = τ ′ ↓ t
for every thread t, and τ22 a subsequence of τ2.
We note that a similar result has been shown to hold for TSO [14]. The currrent
setting requires a more subtle cost function on computations.
Corollary 1. In a minimal violation τ = τ1 ·a·τ2 ·b·τ3 ∈ C(P) with thread(a) =
thread(b) we have a→+hb b through τ2.
The corollary is particularly interesting in the setting where action b has over-
taken action a. In this case, it states that the overtake was actually required
to execute the actions in the following sense. The intermediary actions form a
happens-before-through chain that prevents b from being executed before a. The
existence of this chain renders formally the intuition that minimal violations do
not contain unnecessary delays.
To see the corollary, assume there was no happens-before-through chain.
Lemma 2 would allow us to swap the actions a and b while preserving the per-
thread computations — in contradiction to the fact that the actions stem from
the same thread.
Proof (of Proposition 1). Since b overtakes a, they are from the same thread and
thus program-order dependent. Furthermore, b is a store or a fence. If b →+po a,
it is immediate to complete the cycle stated in (i): Corollary 1 yields a →+hb b
through τ2. If a→
+
po b, we find the issue action isub in τ1, say τ1 = τ1a · isub · τ1b.
From Corollary 1, isub →
+
hb a through τ1b, as required in (ii). ⊓⊔
6 Locality
Theorem 1 (Locality). A concurrent program is not robust if and only if there
is a violating computation where exactly one thread delays actions.
The difficult task is to show completeness. We can show that we only need to
consider minimal violations of the form τ = τ1 · x · τ2 · y · τ3 · sty · τ4 · stx · τ5
where x is overtaken by stx and y is overtaken by sty with x and y being from
different threads. There are two happens-before cycles: one between x and stx,
the other between y and sty. The goal is to move sty back over y to save one
delay while preserving the computation’s trace, or at least get another valid
computation with a slightly different trace that also contains a happens-before
cycle. This will be the cycle between x and stx. Therefore, we get a violation
with less delays than the original one. This contradicts the initial assumption
that the chosen computation was a minimal violation.
With locality at hand, we can constrain the shape of minimal violations. A
similar normal form was presented for TSO in [13], and we can adapt it to the
current setting with minimal changes.
Proposition 2 (Witnesses [13]). Program P is robust if and only if there is
no minimal violation τ = τ1 · isust · τ2 · a · τ3 · st · τ4 ∈ C(P), called witness
computation, that satisfies the following requirements.
(W1) Only tA := thread(st) = thread(a) delays actions.
(W2) τ3 ↓ tA = ε.
(W3) τ1 and τ2 · a · τ3 do not contain delayed actions.
(W4) For every b in τ3 · st we have a→
+
hb b through the intermediary actions.
(W5) τ4 only contains delayed stores and fences of tA.
Following [13], thread tA is referred to as the attacker, the remaining threads
are called helpers. The computation in our running example is a witness:
τ ′ = isua · isub · b · isuc · c · d · e · f · a .
Here, isust is isua and the overtaken action is c. Part τ3 is d · e · f .
7 Singularity
Our second main result shows that it is sufficient to delay only a single store
action. The theorem only holds in the absence of lightweight fence commands,
scfence is still allowed. We stress that the theorem is optimal in the sense that
it characterizes the least relaxation required to violate sequential consistency. A
program without delayed stores is always robust.
Theorem 2 (Singularity). Consider a program without fence. It is not robust
if and only if there is a violation with exactly one delayed store.
The proof is short and derives a contradiction to a strong combinatorial property.
The reasoning is as follows. If the program has a violation with one delayed store,
it is not robust. If the program is not robust, by Proposition 2 there is a minimal
violation that is a witness computation as defined in the previous section. In
this computation, τ4 only consists of delayed stores and fences of the attacker
thread. We assume the program does not contain fence commands. This means
τ4 only consists of delayed stores of the attacker. Now, if more than one store
was delayed, we would have a contradiction to the following Proposition 3 that
came as a surprise to us. A minimal violation will never place two delayed stores
next to each other. This already concludes the argumentation.
Proposition 3 (Two Stores). In the absence of fence, there is no minimal
violation τ1 · st1 · st2 · τ2 with thread(st1) = thread(st2).
8 Instrumentation
To check robustness, we have to look for minimal violations. Proposition 2 re-
duces the search space as we only have to consider minimal violations in witness
form. If the program does not use the fence instruction, then also singularity
holds and τ4 will be empty in all witness computations. Our instrumentation is
an adaptation of [13].
Attacks An attack is a triple A = (tA, stinst, lastinst), where tA is a thread,
stinst is a store instruction of tA, and lastinst is a store or load instruction of tA.
Note that attacks are syntactic objects and there is a quadratic number of them.
An attack A is feasible if there is a witness computation where tA plays the role
of the attacker, st is an instance of stinst, and a is an instance of lastinst. With
Proposition 2, the program is robust if and only if no attack is feasible. Given
an attack, we now develop an instrumentation that finds a witness for it.
The witness computation of interest has four phases:
1. In τ1, all issued stores are immediately written to the memory. Eventually,
the attacker decides to delay a store.
2. In τ2, further actions of the attacker happen either without delay or they are
delayed until τ4. The helpers execute arbitrary actions. At some point, the
attacker does its last normal action a, which is a load or non-delayed store.
3. In τ3, the helpers execute only actions that are happens-before-dependent
on a while the attacker pauses.
4. In τ4, only the attacker’s delayed actions get executed.
We use an observation from [13] that limits the information we have to track
about the delayed stores. The argumentation is as follows. If there are delayed
stores to an address, the attacker will load the last value that was put into the
corresponding buffer. The helpers will load the last value that was stored in
memory. Combined with Property (W3) of witness computations — τ2 · a · τ3
does not contain delayed actions — the content of the buffers is not needed.
All we have to track is two values per address: The current value in memory
and the value of the last buffered store, if any. When the attacker executes a
store that is delayed, it will set the buffered value. When the attacker executes a
store without delay or the helpers execute a store, it updates the current value
in memory. Loads from helpers will always read the current value from memory
while loads from the attacker will prefer the buffered one, if it is set.
Recall that the values in DOM act as addresses. We extend DOM as follows:
For each x ∈ DOM we add auxiliary addresses (x, d) and (x, hb). The addresses
(x, d) hold the values of the last buffered stores. The addresses (x, hb) are used
to track the happens-before-dependencies required by (W4). Here, we rely on
the mechanism from [13]. Furthermore, we add the auxiliary addresses hb and
suc. Flag hb will tell the helpers that Phase 3 has started and they must execute
hb-dependent actions. Flag suc indicates a feasible attack.
Instrumentation of the Attacker for Locality The attacker operates in
three modes. Initially, instructions are executed under SC (Phase 1). Upon ex-
ecution of stinst, the attacker can decide to delay that store. If the store is to
address x, we save the stored value to (x, d) and the address x to an auxiliary
register rstA . The control flow changes to a modified copy of the code for Phase 2.
During Phase 2, when the attacker has to load from address y, it will first
check whether (y, d) is set. If so, it reads that value, otherwise it reads the value
of y. A store to address y can either directly go to memory location y or it is
delayed and stored to (y, d). If there already is a buffered value, then the store
cannot be done on memory and has to update the buffered value — due to the
FIFO property of buffers. Additionally, we have to delay all stores if there was
a fence that had to be delayed. A fence has to be delayed if there is a buffered
value for at least one of its addresses. We use an additional register rfence as a
flag indicating that a fence has been delayed. An scfence action is not permitted
in Phase 2 and will lead to a deadlock.
Upon execution of lastinst, the attacker can decide that this is its last action.
If it is a load, we make sure that there is no buffered value for that address.
Otherwise, there is no possibility for hb-dependent actions in τ3. We set the hb
flag and go to a special wait label. If lastinst is a store, then we have to make
sure that it can be stored directly, i.e., there is no delayed fence and no delayed
store for that address. We execute the store, set the hb flag, and go to the wait
label.
The third mode is in the wait label. The attacker waits until a helper thread
has completed the happens-before chain, in which case it sets the success flag.
Compared to [13] for TSO, what is new is the handling of non-delayed stores
and fences, and the optimized detection of violations by the attacker.
Optimized Instrumentation of the Attacker for Singularity When the
program does not make use of the fence instruction, then singularity holds. We
can simplify the above instrumentation as follows. As only one store is delayed,
we can use a single register rdelayval instead of the auxiliary addresses (x, d) to
save the corresponding value. Recall that the address is kept in rstA .
9 Discussion
We have shown that locality and singularity hold for virtually all store-atomic
consistency models (singularity holds in the absence of fence instructions).
Based on this, we have shown how to reduce robustness to reachability under
SC. The study was motivated by our interest in PGAS clusters. The immediate
next question to ask is whether similar results could hold for non-store-atomic
models like Power. The answer is: We do not yet know. There is, however, a
number of proof principles for relaxed consistency models that came out of this
investigation. First, it seems that a dichotomy lemma is helpful: Whenever there
are two actions from the same thread, there already is a happens-before path
between them (Corollary 1). This, in turn, seems to hold whenever we minimize
the cost of computations according to the number of delays plus the reorderings.
We did not have this result in our work on Power [23] but one may be able to
lift it. Another attractive result that one may want to generalize is the delay of
neighboring elements, which is forbidden under minimality (Proposition 3). The
ultimate goal would be to develop an understanding under which conditions a
consistency model would satisfy a property like locality or singularity.
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A Details on the Semantics
Consider a program P consisting of the threads THRD = {t1, . . . , tn}. Let LAB
be the set of all labels that are declared in P . Assume each thread ti has the
initial label l0,i and defines the registers ri. We use VAR := DOM∪∪i∈[1,n]ri to
refer to the set of all variables, i.e., the set of all addresses in the global memory
and all local registers.
The operational semantics defines a transition relation between states. A
state s = (pc, val, buf) consists of a program counter, a variable valuation, and
some buffer content. The program counter pc : THRD → LAB tracks for each
thread the label of the instruction to be executed next. The variable valuation
val : VAR→ DOM contains the value of each local register and the value of each
address in the global memory. The buffer content buf = buf1 ∪ buf2 is buf1 :
THRD × DOM → DOM∗ and buf2 : THRD → (DOM
∗)∗. The first ones are
the per-address buffers in each thread. The second are the all-addresses buffers.
They contain the stores (as mappings from addresses to values in DOM×DOM)
and the fences (as sequences of addresses in DOM∗). The initial state is defined
by s0 := (pc0, val0, buf0) with pc0(ti) := l0,i for all ti ∈ THRD, val0(x) := 0
for all x ∈ VAR, and buf1(t, a) := ε, buf2(t) := ε for all t ∈ THRD, a ∈ DOM.
Here, we use ε for the empty word.
The transition rules are shown in Figure 3. They implement the behavior
explained above. We use − ↓ − for the projection of a sequence to a subset of
its actions. Note that the transitions are labeled by actions from
ACT := THRD× (({st, ld} ×DOM2) ∪ {isu, loc, scfence} ∪ ({fence} ×DOM∗)).
Every action contains its executing thread. An action can be a store or load
annotated with an address and a value, an issue, local, or scfence action, or a
fence action with a list of addresses. The isu action denotes the issue of a store
or fence action. We use isua to refer to the issue that action a corresponds to.
A computation is a sequence of actions that describes a single execution of a
program. The set of computations of program P is
C(P) := {τ ∈ ACT∗ | s0
τ
−→ s = (pc, val, buf) with
∀t ∈ THRD . ∀a ∈ DOM . buf(t) = ε ∧ buf(t, a) = ε} .
It contains all sequences of actions following the transition relation starting at
the initial state and ending at a state with empty buffers. The latter requirement
does not restrict the program behavior. Buffers can always be emptied.
instr = r ← mem[fa(ra)] a = fa(val(ra)) buf(t, a) = β · v
(pc, val, buf)
(t,ld,a,v)−−−−−−→ (pc′, val[r := v], buf)
early read 1
instr = r ← mem[fa(ra)]
a = fa(val(ra)) buf(t, a) = ε buf(t) ↓ (a← ∗) = β · (a← v)
(pc, val, buf)
(t,ld,a,v)−−−−−−→ (pc′, val[r := v], buf)
early read 2
instr = r ← mem[fa(ra)]
a = fa(val(ra)) buf(t, a) = ε buf(t) ↓ (a← ∗) = ε v = val(a)
(pc, val, buf)
(t,ld,a,v)−−−−−−→ (pc′, val[r := v], buf)
read memory
instr = mem[fa(ra)]← fv(rv) a = fa(val(ra)) v = fv(val(rv))
(pc, val, buf)
(t,isu)−−−−→ (pc′, val, buf[(t, a) := buf(t, a) · v])
issue store
buf(t, a) = v · β buf(t) = γ
(pc, val, buf)
ε−→ (pc, val, buf[(t, a) := β][t := γ · (a← v)])
advance buffer
buf(t) = (a← v) · β
(pc, val, buf)
(t,st,a,v)−−−−−−→ (pc, val[a := v], buf[t := β])
store to memory
instr = scfence buf(t) = ε ∀a ∈ DOM.buf(t, a) = ε
(pc, val, buf)
(t,scfence)−−−−−−−→ (pc′, val, buf)
scfence
instr = fence a1 . . . an ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n.buf(t, ai) = ε
(pc, val, buf)
(t,isu)−−−−→ (pc′, val, buf[t := buf(t) · fence a1 . . . an])
issue fence
buf(t) = (fence a1 . . . an) · β
(pc, val, buf)
(t,fence a1...an)−−−−−−−−−−−→ (pc′, val, buf[t := β])
fence
instr = r ← f(r)
(pc, val, buf)
(t,loc)−−−−→ (pc′, val[r := f(val(r))], buf)
local assignment
instr = assert f(r) f(val(r)) 6= 0
(pc, val, buf)
(t,loc)−−−−→ (pc′, val, buf)
local assertion
Figure 3. Transition rules from state (pc, val, buf) with pc(t) = l and instruction
l : instr; goto l′. Throughout the definition, we let pc′ := pc[t := l′]. The first three
rules make sure that a read will get the value of the latest buffered store from the own
thread, if any, and otherwise the value from memory. We call a read from one of the
buffers an early read. The issue store rule puts a store into the thread’s per-address
buffer. The advance buffer rule moves the oldest store from a per-address buffer to
the all-addresses buffer. The store to memory rule deletes the oldest store from the
all-addresses buffer and reflects its effect in the global memory. The scfence rule allows
for the execution of the scfence command if the current thread’s buffers are empty. The
issue fence rule allows for the execution of the fence command if the current thread’s
per-address buffers for the given addresses are empty. The fence rule allows us to track
the order of executed stores and fences.
B Happens-before Relations
The formal definition for the relations of happens-before is as follows: The
program-order relation of a thread t is obtained by projecting computation τ to
the actions of this thread. For stores and fences that are subject to delays, what
matters is the moment they are issued. The actual actions are also projected
away, denoted by not delayed :
→tpo := τ ↓ (t, not delayed, ∗, ∗).
The program-order relation of the program is then the union of the program
orders relations of all threads, →po :=
⋃
t∈P →
t
po.
The store order is defined similarly. We first obtain the store order relation
of each address a by projecting τ to (∗, st, a, ∗). Then we define the store order
of the program to be the union of all →ast.
The source relation is defined via the partial source function srcτ that maps
the load actions in τ to the store actions in τ . The function returns the store
that a load reads its value. If the function is undefined, the load reads the initial
value. For τ = α · ld · β with thread(ld) = t and addr(ld) = a, we define
srcτ (ld) :=
{
x, if α ↓ isu((t,st,a,∗) in β) = γ · isux
y, if α ↓ isu((t,st,a,∗) in β) = ε ∧ α ↓ (∗, st, a, ∗) = γ · y.
The first case looks for the latest suitable store of the same thread that is already
issued but not yet stored. In this case, the load will perform an early read. If
there is no such store, the second case looks for the latest suitable store on the
global memory. With this, we have srcτ (ld)→src ld, provided srcτ (ld) is defined.
The conflict relation is derived from →src and →st. We have ld →cf st, if
there is a store st′ with st′ →src ld and st
′ →st st. Moreover, we have ld →cf st
if both access the same address, there is no st′ →src ld and no st
′′ →st st.
C Missing Proofs
To prove the dichotomy result, we first need to show a technical lemma. It gives
information about the shape of the last action that has been overtaken by a
store.
Lemma 3. In a minimal violation τ = τ1 · isust · τ2 · a · τ3 · st · τ4 ∈ C(P) with
thread(st) = t = thread(a) and τ3 ↓ t = ε, action a is one of the following:
– a load of an address different from addr(st)
– a store
– a fence instruction that was issued before isust.
Proof. We know that a is not an scfence instruction since st overtakes it. If a
was a local or issue action, we could place it after st without changing the trace:
τ ′ := τ1 · isust · τ2 · τ3 · st · a · τ4 also is a violation. Since delays(τ
′) < delays(τ)
we have $(τ ′) < $(τ). This contradicts minimality of τ .
If a was a load of addr(st), we could as well place it after st. We note that a
performs an early read in τ . Since τ3 ↓ t is empty, a reads from the same store
in τ and τ ′. Therefore, the trace is preserved in this case, too. Again, τ ′ has less
delays than τ , which contradicts minimality of τ .
If a was a fence instruction that was issued within τ2, then it could not
contain addr(st). Otherwise, the fence would have moved st to the all-addresses
buffer and from there st would have hit the global memory before a. This is due
to the FIFO behavior of the buffer. Hence, the fence does not contain addr(st).
This means we can place it after st to obtain the new computation τ ′. As the
delays for the fence increase by the same amount as they decrease for the store,
τ ′ has the same number of delays as τ . But τ ′ saves one reordering of st over
the fence. Therefore, we get a contradiction to minimality of τ . ⊓⊔
Proof (of Lemma 2). The lemma is equivalent to ¬(i) implies (ii), which we
prove by induction on the length of τ2.
Base case If length(τ2) = 0, we know that τ = τ1 · a · b · τ3 and a 6→hb b.
If thread(a) = thread(b), then b →+po a. This means b is a store or a fence.
Due to the overtake of b, action a will not be an scfence. If a was an issue, a
local assignment, or an assert, then we could save the overtake of b over a. The
resulting computation τ ′ would still be violating but have a smaller cost than τ .
A contradiction to minimality of τ . So a is a store, a load, or a fence. Assume b
is a store. By FIFO, a is not a store to addr(b). Together with Lemma 3, we know
that a is a load of an address or a store to an address different from addr(b). In
both cases, we can swap a and b leading to a computation τ ′ that has the same
trace as τ and therefore is a violation, too. But τ ′ saves one delay (if a is a load)
or one reordering while preserving the delays (if a is a store). This contradicts
minimality of τ . Assume b is a fence. If a is a load, we can simply swap the
commands. This saves a delay and leads to a contradiction to minimality. If a is
a store or a fence, it would have entered the all-addresses buffer after the fence
b and have left it earlier. This contradicts the FIFO order.
If thread(a) 6= thread(b), then we know from a 6→hb b that a and b are not
two load or store actions operating on the same address where at least one is
a store. Therefore, we can swap a and b leading to a computation τ ′ that has
the same trace and per-thread-computations as τ . Since τ22 is empty, there is
nothing more to show.
Step case Assume the induction hypothesis holds for length(τ2) ≤ n. We
consider a computation τ = τ1 ·a ·τ2 ·b ·τ3 with length(τ2) = n+1. Let τ2 = τ
′
2 ·c.
Since a 6→+hb b through τ2, we have a 6→
+
hb c through τ
′
2 or c 6→hb b.
If a 6→+hb c, then we can apply the induction hypothesis to τ with respect to
a and c. This results in τ ′ = τ1 ·τ
′
21 ·c ·a ·τ
′
22 ·b ·τ3. Applying the hypothesis again
to τ ′ with respect to a and b yields τ ′′ = τ1 · τ
′
21 · c · τ
′
221 · b · a · τ
′
222 · τ3. In both
applications of the hypothesis the trace and the per-thread-computations are
preserved. Furthermore, τ ′222 is a subsequence of τ
′
22 which is a subsequence of
τ ′2. Sequence τ
′
2 in turn is a subsequence of τ2. We conclude with the observation
that the subsequence relation is transitive.
If c 6→hb b, then we can apply the induction hypothesis to τ with respect to
b and c. This results in τ ′ = τ1 · a · τ
′
2 · b · c · τ3. Applying the hypothesis again
to τ ′ with respect to a and b gives τ ′′ = τ1 · τ
′
21 · b · a · τ
′
22 · c · τ3. As above, in
both steps the trace and the per-thread-computations are preserved and τ ′22 is
a subsequence of τ ′2 which is a subsequence of τ2. ⊓⊔
As preparation to prove the locality result, we study the shape of the part
of a computation that follows a cycle. This rear part can only consist of delayed
store and fence actions that respect program order.
Lemma 4 (Rear). Consider a minimal violation τ = τ1 · a · τ2 · b · τ3 ∈ C(P)
with a →+hb b through τ2 and b →
+
po a. Then b · τ3 contains only delayed stores
and fences and these actions respect program order.
Proof. Towards a contradiction, assume b·τ3 contains further actions. We project
b · τ3 to the stores and fences issued in τ1 · a · τ2. The projection will keep b as it
was issued before a. Hence, the resulting computation τ ′ preserves the happens-
before cycle between a and b and therefore is a violation, too. Furthermore, τ ′
is still a valid computation as we did not remove program-order-intermediate
actions and there are no failing assertions after τ2. Removing actions does not
increase the delays or reorders, but it reduces the length. As $(τ ′) < $(τ), we
have a contradiction to minimality of τ .
If b ·τ3 = α ·x ·β ·y ·γ with y →
+
po x, we can rearrange all actions to appear in
program order. Bringing actions in program order will not violate FIFO or fence
restrictions. It might change the store order but it does not affect the happens-
before cycle between a and b. If b is moved behind program-order-earlier stores
and fences of the same thread in τ3, the cycle remains. The reason is that the
happens-before-through relation is stable under insertion of actions. Rearranging
the stores and fences does not change the number of delays, but saves at least
the reordering of y over x. This contradicts minimality of τ . ⊓⊔
The following normalization lemma shows that, given an action, one can remove
all successors that are independent of this action. To be more precise, we move
the independent successors to the left of the given action. Technically, we apply
Lemma 2 to construct a new computation where the independent successors
execute earlier.
Lemma 5 (Dependence). Let τ = α · a · β · γ ∈ C(P) be a minimal violation.
There is a minimal violation τ ′ = α · β′ · a · β′′ · γ ∈ C(P) where Tr(τ ′) = Tr(τ),
τ ′ ↓ t = τ ↓ t for all threads t, β′′ a subsequence of β, and where
for every action b in β′′ we have a→+hb b through the part in between.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the length of β. The base case of an empty
sequence is trivial. Assume the statement holds for length(β) ≤ n and consider
a computation τ = α · a · β · γ with length(β) = n + 1. If every action in β is
happens-before-through dependent on a, then τ ′ := τ satisfies the requirements.
Otherwise, we take the first action b in β so that τ = α · a · β1 · b · β2 · γ and
a 6→+hb b through β1. An application of Lemma 2 gives a computation τ
′ =
α · β11 · b · a · β12 · β2 · γ with the same trace and per-thread-computations as
τ and β12 being a subsequence of β1. Since length(β12 · β2) < length(β) (we
took out b), we can now apply the induction hypothesis to τ ′. It gives another
computation τ ′′ = α · β11 · b · (β12 · β2)
′ · a · (β12 · β2)
′′ · γ, where (β12 · β2)
′′ is a
subsequence of β12 ·β2. As β12 is a subsequence of β1 and β1 ·β2 is a subsequence
of β, we conclude that (β12 · β2)
′′ is a subsequence of β. As Lemma 2 and the
induction hypothesis preserve the per-thread-computations and the trace, the
corresponding equalities are fulfilled, too. The dependency requirement directly
follows from the induction hypothesis. ⊓⊔
C.1 Locality
Proof (of Theorem 1).
If the program admits violations, then there is one that is local in the sense
that only one thread delays actions. Towards a contradiction, we assume that in
all violations at least two threads delay actions. (If no thread delays actions, the
computation is SC.) Among these violations, let τ be a minimal one. We define:
y := last isu or load action that has been overtaken by a store
sty := earliest store that overtook y
ty := thread(y)(= thread(sty))
x := last isu or load from a thread tx 6= ty that has been overtaken by a store
stx := earliest store that overtook x.
Lemma 6. x, y, stx, and sty exist.
We defer the proof of the lemma for the moment. Given y, x, sty, and stx, the
computation takes one of the following forms (for some τ1, . . . , τ5 ∈ ACT
∗):
τ = τ1 · x · τ2 · stx · τ3 · y · τ4 · sty · τ5 (1)
τ = τ1 · x · τ2 · y · τ3 · sty · τ4 · stx · τ5 (2)
τ = τ1 · x · τ2 · y · τ3 · stx · τ4 · sty · τ5 . (3)
The task is to show that each of the forms yields a contradiction.
Form (1): We apply Proposition 1 to x and stx and get a happens-before cycle
within τ1 · x · τ2 · stx. By Lemma 4, the part starting with stx consists of stores
and fences only. This contradicts the fact that y is an isu or a load.
Form (3): With Proposition 1, we get a happens-before cycle within τ1 · x ·
τ2 · y · τ3 · stx. By Lemma 4, the part after stx consists of delayed stores and
fences only. Proposition 1 yields a happens-before chain from x to stx. We can
rearrange the computation as follows:
τ ′ = τ1 · x · τ2 · y · τ3 · (τ4 ↓ ty) · sty · stx · (τ4 ↓ rest) · τ5 .
The happens-before chain is still present as the relation is stable under insertion.
As we did not change the per-thread-computations, τ ′ is a minimal violation,
too. It has Form (2), which yields a contradiction as we will show next.
Form (2): We will show that there are two happens-before cycles, one between
x and stx, the other between y and sty. The ultimate goal is to move sty back
over y to save one delay. We can do this in such a way that there remains a
happens-before cycle between x and stx. The resulting computation is therefore
a violation with less delays, which contradicts minimality of τ .
By Corollary 1, we have y →+hb sty through τ3. With this, Lemma 4 applies
and shows that τ4 · stx · τ5 only consists of delayed stores and fences.
We apply Lemma 5 to τ3 and obtain
τ ′ := τ1 · x · τ2 · τ
′
3 · y · τ
′′
3 · sty · τ4 · stx · τ5.
Computation τ ′ is again a minimal violation. It is a violation as we do not change
the trace. It is minimal as we do not change the per-thread computations, and
the delays and reorders are counted per thread.
By Lemma 5, every action in τ ′′3 is happens-before-through dependent on
action y. By Proposition 1, we moreover have y →+hb sty through τ
′′
3 . This means,
we find an access to addr(sty) in τ
′′
3 . Let acc be the first such access and let
τ ′′3 = τ
′′
3a · acc · τ
′′
3b. We move sty over τ
′′
3b. Since the store cannot be moved over
fences due to the FIFO all-addresses buffer, we obtain the computation
τ ′′ := τ1 · x · τ2 · τ
′
3 · y · τ
′′
3a · acc · (τ
′′
3b ↓ fences of ty) · sty·
(τ ′′3b ↓ delayed) · τ4 · stx · τ5 .
Here, τ ′′3b ↓ delayed is the projection of τ
′′
3b to the delayed stores and fences
(of threads different from ty). Computation τ
′′ is executable, i.e., in the set of
computations of the program. Indeed, starting from acc it does not contain any
assertions that could fail. The assertions before acc continue to hold as τ ′ was
executable. Computation τ ′′ is a violation due to the cycle y →+hb acc →cf/st
sty →
+
po y. It is minimal as we do not change the computation of thread ty and
potentially only remove delays or reorders from the computations of the other
threads. Actually, there is no removal. As we started from a minimal violation,
we get that τ ′′3b ↓ delayed has to be all of τ
′′
3b except for the fences of ty.
Applying Corollary 1, we get x happens before stx through
τ2 · τ
′
3 · y · τ
′′
3a · acc · (τ
′′
3b ↓ fences of ty) · sty · (τ
′′
3b ↓ delayed) · τ4 . (4)
Our goal is to move sty before y in order to save a delay. This move should
preserve the relation x→+hb stx through (4). Moving sty also moves all fences of
ty in τ
′′
3a. Since (τ
′′
3a ↓ fences of ty) · (τ
′′
3b ↓ fences of ty) = (τ
′′
3 ↓ fences of ty), the
resulting computation can be written as
τ ′′′ := τ1 · x · τ2 · τ
′
3 · (τ
′′
3 ↓ fences of ty) · sty · y·
(τ ′′3a ↓ rest) · acc · (τ
′′
3b ↓ delayed) · τ4 · stx · τ5 .
The computation is executable because τ ′′3a ↓ rest does not contain an access to
addr(sty). This is due to the choice of acc as the first access to the address.
It remains to show that x→+hb stx through (4) still holds. If sty is not on this
happens-before-through chain, we are done. If the chain contains sty, we have
that x →+hb a →po+/cf/st sty →st st →
∗
st stx for some actions a and st in (4)·stx
(st can be stx). If we have a program-order dependence from a to sty, this is not
changed by moving sty back over y. Computation τ
′′′ contains the chain x→+hb
a→+po sty →src/st acc→cf/st st→
∗
st stx. Indeed, as y is chosen to be a load or an
issue, we know that action a (which is program-order earlier than sty) has to lie
before y in (4). If we have a conflict or a store dependence from a to sty, we know
that a = acc. In this case, τ ′′′ contains the chain x →+hb acc →cf/st st →
∗
st stx.
Therefore, τ ′′′ contains the cycle x →+hb stx →
+
po x and thus is a violation. As
the rearrangement saves one delay of y, τ ′′′ contradicts minimality of τ ′′. ⊓⊔
Proof (of Lemma 6). To argue for the existence, we first show that each thread
that delays actions will in particular delay stores. Assume this is not the case
and the thread only delays fences. Take the first fence that gets delayed. It is
not delayed over stores. The FIFO property of the all-addresses buffer would
force the stores to be delayed with the fence, but there are no delayed stores.
Furthermore, the fence cannot be delayed over other fences. There is no earlier
delayed fence, as we took the first one, and there cannot be a non-delayed fence
due to the FIFO property that forbids reorderings among fences. The fence is
thus delayed over loads, local actions, and issues only. Overtakes of fences over
these actions can be dropped without changing the trace while reducing the cost
of the computation. A contradiction to minimality of τ .
To find the required y and sty and x with stx, we project τ to a thread t
that delays actions. With the previous reasoning, the thread delays at least one
store st. Let the last action overtaken by st be a. We thus have
τ ↓ t = τ1 · isust · τ2 · a · st · τ3 for some τ1, τ2, τ3 ∈ ACT
∗.
By Lemma 3, a can be a load, a store, or a fence. In case of a load or a store
issued in τ2, we are done. If a is a store issued in τ1 = τ1a · isua · τ1b, then isust
is an issue action overtaken by the store a. If a is a fence, the situation is more
delicate. In this case, the full computation is
τ = τ1 · isufence · τ2 · isust · τ3 · fence · τ4 · st · τ5 for some τ1, . . . , τ5 ∈ ACT
∗.
An application of Corollary 1 gives isust →
+
hb fence through τ3. As there is no
forward→+po relation from isust to fence, we will find actions of thread t on this
path. The isust action can only have an outgoing →po dependence to a local, a
load, or an issue action in τ3. The load or the issue would serve as the required
action overtaken by st. For the local action, the same reasoning applies. Since
we eventually need a →cf or →st dependence to form a happens-before-through
chain, and since local actions have no such outgoing dependencies, we are sure
to find a load or an issue. ⊓⊔
Proof (of Proposition 2). Let tA be the one thread delaying actions. The first
action that is delayed has to be a store. If it was a fence, we could simply save
the delay by executing it directly after its issue action. There will be no store
with a fenced address in between. So let st be the first action that is delayed
and let a be the last action that is overtaken by st. We have
τ = τ1 · isust · τ2 · a · τ3 · st · τ4
with τ3 ↓ tA = ε. By Lemma 3, a is a load, a store, or a fence action that
was issued in τ1. The latter one is not possible as st is the first action that
was delayed. Therefore, a is either a load or a store issued in τ2 and we have
st →+po a. With Corollary 1, we get a →
+
hb st through τ3. Altogether, there is
the happens-before cycle st →+po a →
+
hb st. Lemma 4 ensures that τ4 consists
of landing stores and fences only. As tA is the only thread delaying actions, τ4
solely contains actions of thread tA.
We can show that τ2 · a does not contain delayed actions. Towards a con-
tradiction, assume there is a first action x in τ2 · a that is delayed over the last
action b. As st is the first action that gets delayed, x is issued in τ2. We have
τ2 ·a = α · isux ·β · b ·γ ·x ·δ with thread(b) = thread(x) = tA and γ ↓ tA = ε. We
know that x has to be a store. If it was a delayed fence, we argue that we could
drop a delay of x. If b was a store or fence action, then it was not delayed as x is
the first delayed action. This implies a reordering between x and b. Reorderings
between fences as well as reordering a later issued store before an earlier issued
fence is not possible due to the FIFO property of the all-addresses buffer. In the
remaining cases, b being an issue, local, or load action, we can drop the delay of
x over b, which again contradicts minimality of τ .
By Lemma 3, b is either a load, a store, or a fence issued before isux. The
latter fence is not possible as the only delayed action earlier than x is st. With
the same argument, we know that b will be issued in β if it is a store. Corollary 1
yields the cycle b →+hb x →
+
po b. Applying Lemma 4, we know that the actions
starting with x have to respect program order, in particular x →+po st. But x is
issued after isust, which contradicts that order.
Furthermore, we can assume that for every action c in τ3 ·st we have a→
+
hb c.
If this is not the case, we can apply Lemma 5 to get a minimal violation that
fulfills that property. ⊓⊔
C.2 Singularity
Proof (of Proposition 3). Towards a contradiction, assume there is such a compu-
tation and let t := thread(st1) = thread(st2). We have st1 →
+
po st2, for otherwise
we could swap the stores violating minimality of τ . Action st2 is issued in τ1, say
τ1 = τ1a · isust2 · τ1b. The overall strategy will be to move st1 back over isust2 .
We find the first action acc′ that is (i) before st1 in the relation→cf/st→
∗
po and
(ii) placed on an isust2 →
+
hb st1 chain through τ1b. Intuitively, action acc
′ is from
another thread (→cf/st) and accesses an address that leads to a program-order
dependence (→∗po). Technically, we first apply Lemma 5 to τ1b and get
τ ′ = τ1a · τ
′
1b · isust2 · τ
′′
1b · st1 · st2 · τ2 .
By Corollary 1, we have isust2 →
+
hb st1 through τ
′′
1b. This path contains an access
acc′ with (1) isust2 →
+
hb acc
′ →cf/st st1 or (2) isust2 →
+
hb acc
′ →cf/st st
′ →+po st1.
Looking at the second case, st′ really has to be a store since there are only stores
in τ ′′1b that are program-order-earlier than st1.
We are interested in the first access to addr(acc′). To be precise, we consider
all possible choices for acc′. For each acc′, we find the first access acc to addr(acc′)
in τ ′′1b = τ
′′
1b1 · acc · τ
′′
1b2. Among all possible acc, we take the first one.
We place all interesting actions together:
τ ′′ := τ1a · τ
′
1b · isust2 · τ
′′
1b1 · acc · (τ
′′
1b2 ↓ t) · st1 · st2 · (τ
′′
1b2 ↓ rest) · τ2 .
Assume we projected the part after acc to landing stores. Then it is easy to
see that τ ′′ is executable and has the same per-thread-computations as τ ′ or
even less delays. We have isust2 →
+
hb acc, (1) acc →cf/st st1 respectively (2)
acc→cf/st st
′ →+po st1, and st1 →
+
po st2. Because of this happens-before cycle, τ
′′
is a minimal violation. Minimality of τ ′′ ensures that the assumed projection was
not necessary, since the part in question did not contain any non-store action.
The stores after acc are consistent with the program order as rearranging the
stores would keep the cycle and save some reorders.
To conclude the argumentation, we rely on the following lemma, the proof
of which we defer for the moment.
Lemma 7. All stores in (τ ′′1b2 ↓ t) · st1 · st2 are to the address addr(acc).
With this result, we can move st1 before isust2while preserving the cycle:
τ ′′′ := τ1a · τ
′
1b · (τ
′′
1b2 ↓ t) · st1 · isust2 · τ
′′
1b1 · acc · st2 · (τ
′′
1b2 ↓ rest) · τ2 .
Since there is no assertion after acc and acc is the only action that could have
loaded a different value, the computation is executable. It still contains the cycle
isust2 →
+
hb acc→cf/st st2. A contradiction to minimality of τ
′′. ⊓⊔
Proof (of Lemma 7). We look at (τ ′′1b2 ↓ t) · st1 first. Assume this part contains
a store to a different address and take the first one. By the choice of acc, τ ′′1b1
does not contain an access by another thread to that address. We can place the
store directly before isust2 . The resulting computation is still executable, has the
same trace, and saves one delay (over isust2). This contradicts minimality of τ
′′.
Now we look at st2. Assume it is to an address different from addr(acc). If
there is a first access acc2 of another thread to addr(st2) in τ
′′
1b1 = τ
′′
1b1a·acc2·τ
′′
1b1b,
we can use this access to have a cycle in a rearranged computation with less
delays: τ1a · τ
′
1b · (τ
′′
1b2 ↓ t) · st1 · isust2 · τ
′′
1b1a · acc2 · st2 · . . . (append the remaining
actions in the order they appear in τ ′′ and project them to landing stores). Here
we have isust2 →
+
hb acc2 →cf/st st2. So there is no such access acc2.
We can place action st2 directly after isust2 without changing the trace. If
τ ′′1b1 contains an action of t that is not a delayed store, this already contradicts
minimality of τ ′′ as we save delays. We show that isust2 →
+
hb acc through τ
′′
1b1
implies the existence of such a not-delayed-store. The path begins with isust2 and
has to switch to acc somewhere. The outgoing relation of an issue can only be
program order. Only load and store actions create conflict or store dependencies
to acc. Because of the program order, such a store would not be delayed. ⊓⊔
D Details of the Instrumentation
D.1 Instrumentation of the Attacker for Locality
To begin with, we give the instrumentation of the attacker. For a precise defini-
tion, let tA declare registers r
∗, have initial location l0, and define instructions
〈linst〉∗ that contain stinst and lastinst from the attack. The instrumentation is
[[tA]] := thread t˜A regs r
∗, rstA , rfence init l0
begin 〈linst〉∗ [[stinst]]A1 [[lastinst]]A2 [[〈linst〉]]
∗
A3 wait end ,
where the functions are defined in Figure 4.
D.2 Optimized Instrumentation of the Attacker for Singularity
The optimized translation for singularity is
[[tA]] := thread t˜A regs r
∗, rstA , rdelayval init l0
begin 〈linst〉∗ [[stinst]]A1 [[lastinst]]A2 [[〈linst〉]]
∗
A3 wait end ,
where the functions are defined in Figure 5.
D.3 Instrumentation of Helpers
The instrumentation of helpers is taken from [13]. We recall it here for complete-
ness. Initially, a helper executes its actions normally. When the hb flag is set by
the attacker, the helper executes only actions that are hb-dependent on a. To
decide whether an action is hb-dependent on a, we use the following observation
from [13]. We have to track the maximal so-called access level for each address,
in the order
no acces < load access < store access .
So if an address y has seen a load but no store, we will keep the value load access
in (y, hb). If the address has also seen a store, we keep store access in (y, hb),
even if there have been later loads. The point is that the store is guaranteed to
construct a dependency with further actions, while a load will only construct a
conflict with subsequent stores.
For the formal definition, let the helper thread t declare registers r∗, have
initial label l0, and define instructions 〈linst〉
∗. The instrumented thread is
[[t]] := thread t˜ regs r˜, r∗ init l0
begin [[〈linst〉]]∗H0 [[〈ldstinst〉]]
∗
H1 [[〈linst〉]]
∗
H2 end ,
where the functions are defined in Figure 6.
E Evaluation
We have implemented our instrumentation on top of Trencher [13] and run the
resulting tool on a set of example programs. Figure 7 shows the evaluation
with partial-order reduction and liveness-based optimization. Figure 8 shows
the evaluation with the optimizations turned-off. The tables show how many
threads, labels, and instructions the programs have, whether or not they were
detected as robust, and the number of visited states for the singularity-based and
locality-based analysis. The time for the SC-reachability analysis was negligible
(< 8 seconds) in all examples.
Depending on the input program, singularity cuts down the search space to
a third as compared with locality (Dekker: From 121 states with locality only
43 remain with singularity). More importantly, this is the first (and complete)
robustness analyis for PGAS programs.
[[l1: mem[e1]← e2; goto l2;]]A1 := l1: mem[(e1, d)]← (e2, d); goto l˜x; (5)
l˜x: rstA ← e1; goto l˜2;
[[l1: r ← mem[e]; goto l2;]]A2 := l˜1: assert mem[(e, d)] = 0; goto l˜x1; (6)
l˜x1: mem[hb] ← true; goto l˜x2;
l˜x2: mem[(e,hb)]← lda; goto l˜wait;
[[l1: mem[e1]← e2; goto l2;]]A2 := l˜1: assert rfence = 0; goto l˜x1; (7)
l˜x1: assert mem[(e1, d)] = 0; goto l˜x2;
l˜x2: mem[e1] ← e2; goto l˜x3;
l˜x3: mem[hb] ← true; goto l˜x4;
l˜x4: mem[(e1, hb)] ← sta; goto l˜wait;
[[l1: mem[e1]← e2; goto l2;]]A3 := l˜1: assert rfence = 0; goto l˜x1; (8)
l˜x1: assert mem[(e1, d)] = 0; goto l˜x2;
l˜x2: mem[e1] ← e2; goto l˜2;
l˜1: mem[(e1, d)]← (e2, d); goto l˜2;
[[l1: r ← mem[e]; goto l2;]]A3 := l˜1: assert mem[(e, d)] = 0; goto l˜x1; (9)
l˜x1: r ← mem[e]; goto l˜2;
l˜1: assert mem[(e, d)] 6= 0; goto l˜x2;
l˜x2: (r,d)← mem[(e, d)]; goto l˜2;
[[l1: local; goto l2;]]A3 := l˜1: local; goto l˜2; (10)
[[l1: scfence; goto l2;]]A3 := (11)
[[l1: fencea1...an; goto l2;]]A3 := l˜1: rfence ← true; goto l˜2; (12)
l˜1: assert mem[(a1, d)] = 0; goto l˜x2;
l˜x2: assert mem[(a2, d)] = 0; goto l˜x3;
...
l˜x(n−1): assert mem[(an−1, d)] = 0; goto l˜xn;
l˜xn: assert mem[(an, d)] = 0; goto l˜2;
wait := l˜wait: assert mem[(rstA , hb)] 6= 0; goto l˜x1; (13)
l˜x1: mem[suc] ← true; goto l˜x2;
Figure 4. Instrumentation of the attacker for locality.
[[l1: mem[e1] ← e2; goto l2;]]A1 := l1: rdelayval ← e2; goto l˜x; (14)
l˜x: rstA ← e1; goto l˜2;
[[l1: r ← mem[e]; goto l2;]]A2 := l˜1: assert rstA 6= e; goto l˜x1; (15)
l˜x1: mem[hb]← true; goto l˜x2;
l˜x2: mem[(e,hb)]← lda; goto l˜wait;
[[l1: mem[e1] ← e2; goto l2;]]A2 := l˜1: assert rstA 6= e1; goto l˜x1; (16)
l˜x1: mem[e1]← e2; goto l˜x2;
l˜x2: mem[hb]← true; goto l˜x3;
l˜x3: mem[(e1, hb)] ← sta; goto l˜wait;
[[l1: mem[e1] ← e2; goto l2;]]A3 := l˜1: assert rstA 6= e1; goto l˜x; (17)
l˜x: mem[e1] ← e2; goto l˜2;
[[l1: r ← mem[e]; goto l2;]]A3 := l˜1: assert rstA 6= e; goto l˜x1; (18)
l˜x1: r ← mem[e]; goto l˜2;
l˜1: assert rstA = e; goto l˜x2;
l˜x2: r ← rdelayval; goto l˜2;
[[l1: local; goto l2;]]A3 := l˜1: local; goto l˜2; (19)
[[l1: scfence; goto l2;]]A3 := (20)
wait := l˜wait: assert mem[(rstA , hb)] 6= 0; goto l˜x1;(21)
l˜x1: mem[suc]← true; goto l˜x2;
Figure 5. Optimized instrumentation of the attacker for singularity.
[[l1: instr; goto l2;]]H0 := l1: assert mem[hb] = 0; goto lx; (22)
lx: instr; goto l2;
[[l1: r ← mem[e]; goto l2;]]H1 := l1: assert mem[(e, hb)] = sta; goto l˜x; (23)
l˜x: r ← mem[e]; goto l˜2;
[[l1: mem[e1] ← e2; goto l2;]]H1 := l1: assert mem[(e1, hb)] ≥ lda; goto l˜x1; (24)
l˜x1: mem[e1]← e2; goto l˜x2;
l˜x2: mem[(e1, hb)]← sta; goto l˜2;
[[l1: local/scfence/fence; goto l2;]]H2 := l˜1: local/scfence/fence; goto l˜2; (25)
[[l1: mem[e1] ← e2; goto l2;]]H2 := l˜1: mem[e1]← e2; goto l˜x; (26)
l˜x: mem[(e1, hb)] ← sta; goto l˜2;
[[l1: r ← mem[e]; goto l2;]]H2 := l˜1: r˜ ← e; goto l˜x1; (27)
l˜x1: r ← mem[r˜]; goto l˜x2;
l˜x2: mem[(r˜, hb)] ← max{lda, mem[(r˜, hb)]}; goto l˜2;
Figure 6. Instrumentation of helpers.
Program T L I Robust? Visited States (Singularity) Visited States (Locality)
cilk-the-wsq-wrongdoing.txt 5 80 79 No 443 513
Cilk’s THE WSQ (non-robust) 3 73 72 Yes 71 122
CLH Lock (robust) 3 42 41 No 1124 1358
Dekker (robust) 2 28 34 No 31 59
Dekker (non-robust) 2 24 30 No 35 83
Lamport (robust) 3 39 42 Yes 12868 12868
Lamport (non-robust) 3 33 36 No 142 162
Lock-Free Stack (robust) 4 46 50 Yes 796 820
MCS Lock (robust) 2 54 58 No 150 160
mfa.txt 3 14 11 No 122 140
mp.txt 2 6 4 No 20 23
Figure 7. Singularity vs. locality with partial-order reduction and liveness.
Program T L I Robust? Visited States (Singularity) Visited States (Locality)
cilk-the-wsq-wrongdoing.txt 5 80 79 No 532 575
Cilk’s THE WSQ (non-robust) 3 73 72 Yes 95 150
CLH Lock (robust) 3 42 41 No 1289 1496
Dekker (robust) 2 28 34 No 37 103
Dekker (non-robust) 2 24 30 No 43 121
Lamport (robust) 3 39 42 Yes 77657 77657
Lamport (non-robust) 3 33 36 No 159 185
Lock-Free Stack (robust) 4 46 50 Yes 5504 5504
MCS Lock (robust) 2 54 58 No 169 176
mfa.txt 3 14 11 No 124 146
mp.txt 2 6 4 No 22 25
Figure 8. Singularity vs. locality without partial-order reduction and liveness.
